Alfredo C. Robles, Jr.
De La Salle University – Manila
13 March 2007

 

1. The European Commission  decided to propose launching FTA negotiations with ASEAN in October 2006 only after its strategies within ASEM and in the ASEAN-EU context failed to achieve their goals, and individual ASEAN members had already concluded FTAs with Japan and/or the US. The process leading up to the decision to negotiate an FTA deserves closer scrutiny, as do the ideas of the ASEAN-EU Vision Group Report and the European Commission regarding the rationale of an FTA.

I.   ASEM – Market Access through Trade Facilitation and Investment Promotion, not  through FTA

2. The ASEM process was initiated in 1996, following a Singaporean proposal. Six summits have been held (Bangkok, 1996; London, 1998; Seoul, 2000; Copenhagen, 2002; Hanoi, 2004; and Helsinki, 2006), in addition to seven meetings of Foreign Ministers, six of Economic Ministers, seven of Finance Ministers, two of Culture Ministers, and one of Labor and Employment Ministers, and ten (the ASEM record) of the Senior Officials on Trade and Investment. The Asia-Europe People’s Forum meets at the same time as the summit, but is not part of the official process.

3. The original participants on the Asian side were the seven ASEAN members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), together with China, South Korea and Japan; and on the European side, the fifteen EU members (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK), together with the European Commission. In 2004, after considerable controversy, the three new ASEAN members (Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos) and the 10 new EU members (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,  Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) were admitted. In 2006, it was decided that India, Mongolia, Pakistan and the ASEAN Secretariat on the Asian side, and Bulgaria and Rumania on the European side, would be allowed to participate in the next summit, scheduled to take place in Beijing in 2008.

4. The EU's main concern in East Asia, as in other regions of the developing world, has been market access, as the Commission very frankly announced in its Market Access Strategy,  published one month before ASEM 1.[1]

5. Market access could be achieved by convincing the Asians to modify their laws and regulations, as announced in the EU's New Asia Strategy,[2] and by using ASEM as a forum to facilitate negotiations in other international fora (mainly the WTO),[3] without ASEM itself becoming a negotiating forum.

6. The EU has sought to achieve its aims by urging the Asians:

- to implement their Uruguay Round commitments;
- to support the launching of a new WTO round, which would cover the four Singapore issues (trade facilitation, investment, competition, and government procurement);
- to implement the allegedly non-binding plans that cover two of the four Singapore issues: The Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) and the Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP).

7. A free trade area was proposed in 1999 by the Asia-Europe Vision Group, which advocated a step-wise approach and a 2025 deadline. Differences in levels of development (between the EU and the Asian states? among the Asian states?) were supposed to be taken into account, but how this was to be done was not explained.[4] However, the recommendation was purely and simply ignored by ASEM participants. This rejection has never been officially explained, but it is likely that the EU feared that a free trade area would cause its trade deficit with several Asian countries to balloon.

8. Instead, ASEM adopted plans for trade facilitation and investment promotion. The two terms should not mislead the observer. Neither of them implies the funding by the EU of projects, such as transfers of technology, trade missions, participation in trade fairs, feasibility studies, the establishment of joint ventures or the lending of money to governments and/or firms for marketing campaigns or product development. In ASEM jargon, these two terms refer to amendments of domestic regulations of Asian countries that the EU and European firms find objectionable.

9. Within the ASEM framework, two lists were prepared: “Consolidated and Prioritised List of the Major Generic Barriers to Trade” under the TFAP and “Most Effective Measures for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment” under TFAP. The two lists give us an idea of the demands of the EU and European firms. For example, the EU objects in the area of government procurement to requirements that companies must have a minimum level of domestically-held shares and domestic content in products. In distribution, European firms do not wish to see any requirements of domestic partnership and joint ventures, obligations on foreign retailers to buy local products for their supermarkets, or the promotion of local products. European companies complain about limits on duration of visas. In the area of investment, Europeans argue that removal of performance requirements (e.g., local content, export and transfer of technology) would attract foreign direct investment. They find unacceptable the obligation to form joint ventures, the prohibition to invest in some sectors, and limits on the number of intracorporate transferees and on the employment of foreigners in management.[5]

10. After a first round of reporting on the allegedly “voluntary” TFAP and IPAP in 2002, the working groups’ activities slowed down. In response, calls were heard for “immediate action for the reduction of trade barriers.”[6]  The sixth ASEM summit also noted the need to consider further action within TFAP and IPAP.[7]

11. The slowing down of ASEM activities demonstrates the growing lack of interest of the Asian countries in the ASEM process. This disinterest is confirmed by the strategy of individual ASEAN members since 2001, consisting in the negotiation of FTAs with the US and/or Japan.

Aware of the intensifying competition with the latter two countries, the EU attempted to ward off the threat by proposing substitutes for FTAs – the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.

 

by Tina Ebro

[Commentary on Julie Gilson's  paper “Structuring   Accountability:  Non-Governmental Participation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)“ at  the Workshop on Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance, University of Gothenburg,  Sweden, 13-15 June 2007.

The workshop critiqued papers --- on civil society vis-a-vis the WB, IMF, WTO, Commonwealth, OECD, ICANN, IFAT, OIC and ASEM -- that would be incorporated  into the book project of Jan Aart Scholte of Warwich University and the University of Gothenburg. ]

I am not speaking here as an AEPF representative but I think the members of the AEPF network will welcome this initiative, and the paper of Julie and our discussions could provide more impetus to the AEPF to address its organizational challenges.

The paper is thoughtful on the general issues of accountability. It is  a good attempt of exploring a highly under-researched topic, namely civil society engagement of inter-regional mechanisms and a good start on laying out the concrete experiences of ASEM-civil society relations. It has also tackled well the lack of external accountability of the ASEM and the structural constraints of civil society in demanding democratic accountability from the ASEM. However, I would suggest changes of some perceptions and conclusions related to the AEPF and further interviews to update and address factual gaps.

Tina Ebro

The 6th Asia-Europe Peoples Forum (AEPF) took place between the 3rd and 6th of September this year in Helsinki, just before the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It was organized by the National Organizing Committee of Finnish NGOs and the International Organizing Committee (IOC) of the AEPF, with the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) as the main coordination point in Asia, and the Transnational Institute (TNI) in Europe.

Since 1996, the AEPF have been organized in Bangkok, London, Korea, Copenhagen and Hanoi. The Forum brings together progressive civil society organizations that critically engage ASEM and challenge its big business bias and neo-liberal agenda, as opposed to an alternative people-centered agenda. From the perspective of activist groups, ASEM, whose member countries (in Europe, East and South-east Asia, including India and Pakistan next year) have influence over half the world’s economies, should be a prime mechanism for cooperation to benefit and create opportunities for all, especially for the poor and disempowered in both Asia and Europe. The Forum in Helsinki was a consolidating event in the development of the AEPF as a unique bi-regional network. It was participated in by 450 individuals from 30 countries and from more than 200 NGOs and social movements, including those from China, Vietnam and the Eastern Europe.
Sommaire Key insights from the sessions

 
Editor’s Note: Published on Page A11 of the September 7, 2006 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer

 

HELSINKI — Here in the land of revered Finnish composer Jan Sibelius (1865-1957), Asian and European peoples’ voices are being aired loudly. Here is a symphony of sounds, so to speak, rising, blowing with the cold Baltic wind that is getting colder by the day.

The event is the Asia-Europe Peoples’ Forum 6 (AEPF 6) for NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) that are non-state and non-corporate. The theme is “People’s Vision: Building Solidarity Across Asia and Europe.”